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Abstract: 
This paper highlights the contributions from the supply side of mortgage markets to the 
variations in the LTV-ratio. The paper starts by deriving the optimal LTV-ratio for a profit 
maximizing mortgagee that supply mortgages using housing as collateral. As the LTV-ratio 
represents the risk exposure of a mortgagee, the optimal LTV-ratio varies according to moral 
hazard, risk pricing, funding structure, lending volume and collateral value. Thinking in terms 
of social welfare, the optimal LTV-ratio is our model one where mortgagees are paid for their 
risk exposure. Our framework allows us to see how different supply side components create a 
wedge between the profit maximizing LTV-ratio and the socially optimal LTV-ratio. It also 
allows for rather straightforward arguments regarding macro-prudential policy. The paper 
continues by analyzing a mortgage’s risk pricing response to falling house prices and an LTV-
ratio that exceeds the LTV-ratio at origination. The paper derives a kinked relation between 
the mortgage rate and the LTV-ratio ex post, distinguishing between risk pricing ex ante and 
ex post.    
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Introduction 
Why do loan-to-value (LTV)-ratios vary across countries and periods? And, why did so many 
countries see higher LTV-ratios in the period preceding the financial crisis?  
The literature on LTV-ratios is extensive. Some papers see the LTV-ratio as an exogenous 
variable determined by government regulation. Others allows for endogenous LTV-ratios 
derived from the interaction between the supply and the demand side of mortgage markets. 
Demand side factors are obviously important for variations in LTV-ratios. A young 
population might demand higher LTV-ratios than an older population with higher savings and 
accumulated equity. In addition, in economies where housing appreciations exceed wage 
growth is the need to borrow a larger share of the price of a dwelling stimulating the demand 
for higher LTV-ratios.  
However, what is actually the supply side contribution to how LTV-ratios evolve? 
The paper analyses the optimal Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio and the risk pricing strategy of a 
profit-maximization mortgagee. When considering the expected profit of a mortgagee we 
distinguish between credit risk assessments ex ante and ex post, where the former is relevant 
for determining the LTV-ratio offered at origination, and the latter for addressing the risk 
pricing response to changes in mortgagees’ risk exposure.     
The aim of the paper is to bring factors important for mortgagees’ optimal LTV-ratio and risk 
pricing onto a standardized and non-technical playing field. Applying the Furlong and Keeley 
(1987, 1989) framework the paper highlights the relation between the risk exposure of a 
mortgagee and the LTV-ratio at origination, as well as the mortgagees’ risk pricing response 
to changing collateral values. Addressing a mortgagee’s risk taking both ex ante and ex post 
in a simplistic common framework helps us understand both mortgage market structures and 
how mortgage markets  respond to shocks. The framework also provide guidance for 
reasoning about macro-prudential policy.   
Abstracting away from the demand side of mortgage markets, the paper first shows how the 
optimal LTV-ratio for a profit-maximizing mortgagee facing moral hazard but not attracting 
deposits, is one where the mortgagee at the margin is paid for its risk exposure. Thinking in 
terms of social welfare, the same condition will determine the socially optimal LTV-ratio in 
the absence of demand side considerations. The paper expands the reasoning on LTV-ratios 
and the risk exposure of a mortgagee by introducing mortgage market features residing on the  
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supply side of the market. The paper includes external funding to allow for LTV-ratio 
arguments both related to deposit insurance and capital-adequacy regulations. Focusing the 
supply side of mortgage markets, the paper also highlights the impact of mortgage volumes 
and collateral appreciations for the profit maximizing LTV-ratio. The wedge these 
characteristics create, compared to the socially optimal LTV-ratio, introduces a rationale for 
macro-prudential features in the model.  
The paper continues by analyzing a mortgagees’ risk pricing response to a housing 
depreciation. Considering a case where, due to a fall in house prices, the current LTV-ratio 
exceeds the LTV-ratio at origination, we turn to a situation where a mortgagee’s current risk 
exposure (ex post) exceeds that at origination (ex ante). When addressing risk-based pricing 
the paper shows how a higher LTV-ratio impacts positively on risk pricing through a number 
of channels, creating a kinked-relation between the LTV-ratio and the mortgage rate ex post. 
This kinked relation is in accordance with risk-based pricing allowing the mortgage rate to be 
influenced both by the higher probability of default and by the larger expected loss in case of 
default. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we relate the model to the 
prevailing literature. In section three, we present the model. The fourth section relates 
(sequentially) the LTV-ratio to moral hazard, risk pricing, funding, lending and collateral.  The 
fifth part derives the kinked relation between the LTV-ratio and the interest rate margin (the 
mortgage rate). The last part concludes.  
Related literature and the model set-up 
Deriving the LTV-ratio from the supply side of mortgage markets, and seeing it as a measure 
of a mortgagee’s risk exposure, contrasts the approach interpreting the (inverse of the) LTV-
ratio as an indicator of how developed a mortgage market is (see for instance Jappelli and 
Pagano (1989)).  
Variations in the LTV-ratio are seen both over time and across markets. Calza et al (2013) 
reports that LTV-ratios differ from 50 percent in Italy to 112 percent in the Netherlands, while 
Amior and Halket (2014) show variations in LTV-ratios across US cities. In particular is the 
latter kind of LTV variation difficult to relate to the degree of mortgage market depth.    
Treating the LTV-ratio as the risk exposure of a mortgagee our framework draws on that of 
Furlong and Keeley (1987, 1989) and Keeley (1990). Taking external funding into account, 
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the paper shows (conventionally) how declining capital-to-asset ratios and favorable deposit 
insurance schemes impact positively on a mortgagee’s risk exposure and the optimal LTV-
ratio. The model also shows how moral hazard and risk pricing impact the LTV-ratio. 
The supply side focus allows us to highlight the endogenous credit constraint of Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997). While higher collateral values stimulate lending, is there a positive feed-
backfeedback effect from lending to house prices and collateral values. Such bidirectional 
causality between house prices and mortgage volumes is for instance shown by Anundsen and 
Jansen (2013) or Sophocles and Vlassoppulos (2009). Like Pavlov and Wachter (2011) and 
Adelino et al (2012) we allow for a positive impact from credit supply to house prices. Our 
credit supply approximation is the prevailing LTV-ratio, argued by Englund (2011) as a better 
indicator of credit supply than, for instance, the more commonly used credit volume, which is 
influenced by both the supply and the demand side of mortgage markets. Kim (2007) relates 
the LTV-ratio to the price-rent ratio and Duca et al (2011) shows that incorporating the LTV-
ratio into the price-to-rent ratio helps to overcome the problem related to that most US house 
price models breaks-down in the mid-2000. However, Duca et al (2010) is one of the few (?) 
papers that explicitly link the LTV-ratio to house prices empirically. The paper finds a long-
run elasticity of house prices with respect to the LTV-ratio for first-time buyers 1.1 ,8.0 .   
Mian and Sufi (2011) show how housing appreciations might stimulate lending both from 
existing homeowners and, by allowing a ‘financially risker’ set of new home-buyers to enter 
the mortgage market, from first-time entrants. Entry of ‘financially risker’ households into 
owner-occupation is also the focus of Gabriel and Rosenthal (2010). Analyzing the guidelines 
given by the US congress to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase funding of low down-
payment (and high LTV) mortgages, they see new entry and increased homeownership rates 
as a main result. Another important finding is how higher LTV-ratios were accompanied by 
increased lending. In our framework we distinguish between the effects from entry into 
homeownership and the effects from existing homeowners by relating both collateral values 
and mortgage volumes to the LTV-ratio. The positive relation between the LTV-ratio and 
mortgage volume captures the effect of a higher LTV-ratio on entry. Higher lending volumes 
impact positively on operating income and, as a mortgagor’s debt increases, on loss given 
default. While the former stimulates risk taking and the LTV-ratio, is the impact from the 
latter negative, making the total effect on the LTV-ratio ambiguous. To highlight the impact 
from existing homeowners we allow for a positive relation between the LTV-ratio and 
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collateral. As appreciations reduce losses in case of default, there is a positive relation 
between the optimal LTV-ratio and collateral values.   
Incorporating moral hazard, risk pricing, external funding (and the accompanying regulations) 
as well as the strategic aspects arising from the impact of mortgage supply on mortgage 
volumes and collateral values allows the model to bring a number of factors that might cause 
variations in the LTV-ratio both over time and across markets onto the same playing-field.  
Our endogenous LTV-ratio is, in opposition to for instance Agarwal et al (2014), Allen and 
Carletti (2013) and Berger et al (2011), supply side driven. Focusing on mortgage supply, 
Borgersen and Robertsen (2012) shows that when regulations are insufficient, market 
developments, in particular expectations of continued collateral appreciation, might impact 
positively on the LTV-ratio as loss given default decreases. Goodhart and Hoffman (2008) 
argue that mortgagees might increase LTV-ratios to fulfill nominal return targets. Integrating 
both supply and demand side effects Lin (2014) applies a monetary general equilibrium model 
and shows how debtor welfare is not monotonically increasing in the LTV-ratio and that the 
optimal LTV-ratio both for the debtor and the creditor allows for the possibility of ex post 
default.  
Analyzing supply side developments, financial innovations are important. Duca et al (2010) 
relates the rise in LTV ratios between 2000 and 2005 to two types of financial innovation 
originating on the supply side: credit scoring technology that enabled the sorting and pricing 
of non-prime mortgages and funding of such loans using collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDSs). There are also demand side links between LTV and 
risk.i Amior and Halket (2013) for instance, show how households average LTV-ratio has a 
strong negative correlation with house price volatility. Borgersen and Greibrokk (2012), 
analyzing mortgagor’s the short term gains from different funding structures, allow leverage 
gains to stimulate the demand for higher LTV-ratios among mortgagors. A side effect of 
higher LTV-ratios is increased risk exposure for mortgagors.   
Instead of focusing on either supply or demand side effects on the LTV-ratio Campbell and 
Hercowitz (2006) argue market innovations following the financial reforms of the early 
1980s, in particular the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St.Germain Act of 1982, 
drastically reduced equity requirements associated with household borrowing.ii Arguing that 
changes in equity requirements follow regulatory changes, they treat equity requirements as 
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exogenous policy choices. Linking variations in the LTV-ratio to the regulatory and legal 
framework is accordance with Ahearne et al (2005). As both capital-adequacy and deposit 
guarantee schemes impact LTV-ratios in our model, we follow this line of reasoning, while 
acknowledging that market developments might take precedence when regulations are 
insufficient.  
Relating risk pricing to the Furlong and Keeley (1987, 1989) framework we apply a parallel 
to the option-pricing approach in the sense that the mortgagor’s equity stake and the LTV-
ratio at origination is a key element. Incorporating the current LTV-ratio our approach is 
along the extensions of Ciochetti, Gao and Yao (2002) and others while, as we abstract away 
from mortgagors cash-flow position, the model is positioned within the equity theory of 
default.iii The equity theory is for instance the starting point of Das and Meadows (2013) 
analyzing strategic default and highlighting the trade-off between future repayment and the 
probability of default that determines the optimal LTV-ratio.  
Discussing risk based mortgage pricing Magri and Pico (2011) argue few papers to be 
concerned with risk based mortgage pricing while the ones that are centers around the US 
market. Bostic (2002) for instance argue that lenders, due to reduced storage costs for data 
and improved credit scoring techniques, started estimating the default risk of each borrower 
during the 90s. Recent US evidence is that easily collateralized household loans, such as 
mortgages, are those that have been most affected by these changes in pricing techniques 
(Magri and Pico, 2011, p. 1277). 
 The standard reference to the option-pricing literature on mortgages is Kau and Keenan 
(1995) while White (2004) provides an interesting supplement. Park and Bang (2014) argue 
the measurement of credit risk to involve three parameters; the possibility of default, loss-
given defaults and the correlation across defaults, where there are few studies of loss-given 
default.iv Distinguishing between risk pricing ex ante and ex post the paper explicitly account 
for the two former effects, where we separate the effect of a higher probability of default from 
that of increased costs in case of default. The model relates the latter to the change in the 
amount of collateralized debt that the distinction between the current LTV-ratio and the LTV-
ratio at origination represents.    
The Mortgagee     
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We consider a mortgagee that takes on deposits D, for which it pays a deposit rate Dr . 
Deposits are conventionally insured by deposit insurance schemes (see for instance Kim, Kim 
and Han (2014)) The mortgagee’s balance sheet identity states that mortgage supply L is 
constrained by mortgagee equity K and received deposits, KDL  . The mortgagee uses 
housing as collateral for mortgages. The mortgagor (household) finances its purchase of a 
house with the value V by either equity E, or a mortgage L, giving the balance sheet identity
ELV  .  
There is a probability p that the household may be able to pay back the mortgage and a 
probability (1-p) that it may not. We refer to the case where the household is able to pay back 
a mortgage as success and the case where it may not as default.  
In the absence of default is the mortgagee profit equal to expected operating income
)( DrLrp Du  , where ur  is the mortgage rate. The mortgagee accepts a loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratio
V
L
 , which means that it - in case of default and with probability (1-p) - covers its 
outstanding debt by its collateralized part of the housing value V equating profit in case of 
default to ))(1( VLp  .   
Expressing a mortgagee’s expected profit as a function of the LTV-ratio )(  we have   
1)                              ))(1()( VLpDrLrp Du   . 
In the forthcoming sections we relate the LTV-ratio to the different components of the profit 
function to highlight their impact on the optimal LTV-ratio for a profit maximizing 
mortgagee.  
Moral hazard   
First, we introduce the probability of success as a decreasing function of the LTV-ratio,
.0)( ),( '   ppp  This automatically implies that the probability of default  ))(1( p is 
increasing in the LTV-ratio. The higher the LTV-ratio the lower (higher) is the probability of 
success (default). The existence of moral hazard in credit markets motivates this argument 
(see for instance Holmstrøm and Tirole (1997) or Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)). A 
higher LTV-ratio reduces (increases) the weight given to operating income (collateral) in the 
profit function.  
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The elasticity )(
)(
'
)( 
  pp
Elpp 




  measures how the probability of success 
responds to a one percent increase in the LTV-ratio. The elasticity is an indicator of the extent 
of moral hazard in the mortgage market. From the sign of the derivative we know that the 
elasticity of success (or stated differently - the moral hazard elasticity) has a negative value
.0p   
Risk pricing 
Risk pricing is introduced by assuming a positive relation between the mortgage rate ur  and 
the LTV-ratio 0)(r  where)( 'u ur . (See for instance Kau and Keenan (1995) for the relation 
between the LTV-ratio and risk pricing). We assume deposits to be the only source of external 
funding, making the interest rate margin between the mortgage rate and the deposit rate. We 
simplify by assuming 1Dr  and equate the mortgage rate  )(ur to the interest rate margin. We 
operationalize the risk-pricing response )(r 'u  to the risk increase associated with a higher 
LTV-ratio by the risk pricing elasticity )(
)(
'
)( 
  u
u
rr rr
El 




 .   
Mortgage volumes 
We allow for a positive relation between the mortgage volume and the LTV-ratio
0)(L   where)( ' L . The argument is that a higher LTV-ratio makes more households able to 
fulfill any given down-payment constraint and become mortgagors. As the number of 
mortgagors increase, so does aggregate lending. Gabriel and Rosenthal (2010) argues for a 
positive relation between the LTV-ratio and mortgage volumes. The lending elasticity 
)(
)(
'
)( 
  LL
ElLL 




 measures mortgage response to a one percent increase in the 
LTV-ratio.   
Collateral values  
Finally, we allow for a positive impulse from LTV-ratios to house prices
0)(V  where)( ' V . The elasticity )(
)(
'
)( 
  VV
ElVV 




  measures the extent to 
which house prices respond to a one percent increase in the LTV-ratio. The argument is part 
of the endogenous credit constraint of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), where the LTV-ratio 
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represents the availability of credit. A positive relation between the LTV-ratio and house 
prices allows credit availability to impact positively on collateral values.v   
Two scenarios  
We apply the model to consider two different scenarios derived from the relation between the 
initial LTV-ratio and the current LTV-ratio (defined as the mortgage volume relative to the 
market value).  
When the mortgage volume relative to the market value of the house falls short of (or is equal 
to) the initial LTV-ratio
V
L
LV   , the expected loss given default is equal to what it 
was at origination, and is correspondingly priced into the current interest rate margin.      
When, on the other hand, the mortgage volume (relative to the market value) exceeds the 
initial LTV-ratio 
V
L
LV    there is a potentially higher default effect on expected 
profits than what was the case at the time of origination. This risk increase is not priced in by 
the mortgagee and will impact risk pricing ex post.  
The former scenario, where we in the following assume
V
L
 , describes the situation at 
origination where mortgage contracts are signed, and is in the fourth section used to derive the 
optimal LTV-ratio. The latter scenario describes a situation where depreciations have lifted 
the current LTV-ratio above the LTV-ratio at origination. This scenario is in the fifth section 
used to analyze a mortgagee’s risk pricing response to a fall in house prices and a higher risk 
exposure for the mortgagee.     
The profit maximizing LTV-ratio 
We now consider a mortgagee at origination to find the profit maximizing LTV-ratio. When 
deriving the optimal LTV-ratio we remember how LV
V
L   . At first, we abstract 
away from all but one of the presumed LTV effects described above, and then we include risk 
pricing, funding, lending and collateral as we go along.  
 
Moral hazard: )(pp   
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Taking moral hazard into account, but abstracting away from all the other LTV-effects, we 
find the optimal LTV-ratio by taking the derivative of 1) with respect to (remembering that
LV  ), as  
2)                               DLrp u  

 ')( . 
This first-order condition 0
)(



 reduces to  DLru  , equalizing operating income to 
zero. If the moral hazard problem is severe, and the probability of success drops significantly 
as the LTV-ratio increases (a high value on  'p ), the mortgagee offers a low LTV-ratio L . 
If the moral hazard problem is small(er), it offers a higher LTV-ratio
H . Figure 1 illustrates 
the situation where, for given values of both lending- and deposit volumes, as well as for a 
given interest rate margin, the moral hazard technology differ. 
 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< Figure 1 about here >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
                       
Figure 1 shows how the LTV-ratio will differ according to the risk profile of mortgagors. In 
the following, we assume fixed the moral hazard technology across all mortgagors.vi 
 
Risk pricing and funding:  0Dor  0 and )(r ),( u  Dpp   
We start by introducing two basic mortgagee characteristics, risk pricing and external 
funding. There are now two effects of a higher LTV-ratio on mortgagee profits as it both 
reduces the probability of success and, by lifting the mortgage rate, improves the interest rate 
margin.   
 
To separate the risk pricing effect from that of funding we first abstract away from deposits, 
D=0, to consider a mortgagee where lending is constrained by own equity. The optimal LTV-
ratio is found by taking the derivative of 1) with respect to the LTV-ratio     
3)                             .)(
)( '' LrpLrp uu 


  
Using the definitions of the moral hazard elasticity 0p and the risk pricing elasticity r , 
we rearrange the condition for 0
)(



 as  
4)                                        
UrP
  . 
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Expression 4) defines (implicitly) the optimal LTV-ratio A as one that equates the response of 
risk pricing to that of moral hazard to a one percent increase in the LTV-ratio. The profit 
maximizing LTV-ratio is one where the mortgagee is paid for its actual risk exposure. 
 
To give our argument some purchase we introduce welfare considerations by deriving the 
socially optimal LTV-ratio. We define the socially optimal LTV-ratio as one that maximizes a 
mortgagee’s expected return L)()rp( max u 

. The first-order condition to this problem 
equals     LrpLrp uu )()(
''   , which also is easily derived from expression 3).  
The optimal LTV-ratio is, from a welfare point of view, equal to the LTV-ratio that comes 
about when lending is funded by mortgagee’s own capital. Expression 4), and the LTV-ratio
A , may be seen as the socially optimal LTV-ratio.  
 
In the following, we include different supply side features and see how these mortgage market 
characteristics create a wedge between this socially optimal LTV-ratio and the LTV-ratio 
maximizing mortgagee profits.   
 
We start by bringing funding back into the game and allow for D>0. The optimal LTV-ratio is 
again found by taking the derivative of 1) with respect to     
5)                         .)(
)( '' LrpDLrp uu 


  
After some rearranging, we find the condition for 0
)(



 as 
6)                             )(''  uu rpLDrp  . 
The left hand side gives the marginal cost of a higher LTV-ratio and the right hand side the 
marginal gain. While the latter is related to the higher interest rate margin, is the former 
derived from the increased probability of default (and the reduced probability of success) that 
accompany a higher LTV-ratio.  
 
Using the definition of p  we express the first-order condition as 
7)                                             
 
)(
)(
' 


u
upB
r
r
L
D 
 ,  
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where the optimal LTV-ratio is a function of the moral hazard elasticity, the interest rate 
margin, how tough risk pricing responds to higher risk and the capital adequacy ratio. (The 
inverse of the deposit to lending ratio, i.e. L/D, is in our model equal to the capital adequacy-
ratio).vii When operating income is positive, 
L
Dru  , we see how the moral hazard elasticity, 
the capital-adequacy ratio and the degree of risk pricing impacts negatively on the LTV-ratio. 
The interest rate margin has, on the other hand, a positive impact on the LTV-ratio.     
 
Alternatively, we may express the first-order condition in terms of elasticities, which is 
congruence with the expression in the absence of external funding and is the approach we 
pursue in the following   
8)                                                  .
)(
)(
L
Dr
r
u
ur
P
U




  
To highlight the funding effect we compare the optimal LTV-ratio B derived from a situation 
with external funding to A , the optimal LTV-ratio in the absence of external funding. The 
assumption of equal moral hazard technologyviii allows us to see directly from expressions 4) 
and 8) respectively, how  
9)                                         
 
L
Dr
r
u
uAB


)(
)(


 . 
Expression 9) shows a positive funding effect on the LTV-ratio AB    as
 
L
Drr uu  )()(  . When mortgagees fund lending by equity and deposits, lending may 
exceed mortgagee equity. This funding structure, where guarantee schemes insure deposits 
and a mortgagee does not carry all the risk associated with its lending activities, stimulates 
rather conventionally mortgagee risk taking and hence the optimal LTV-ratio. 
 
Mortgage volumes: )( and 0D ),(r ),( u  Lpp   
The second extension we pursue is a positive relation between mortgage volumes and the 
LTV-ratio. As mortgagees accept higher LTV-ratios, more households are able to fulfill the 
lower down-payment constraints, and become mortgagors, which again impact positively on 
aggregate lending.  
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When the lending effect is taken into account, a higher LTV-ratio has three effects on 
mortgagee profits: First, it reduces the probability of success. Second, it lifts the interest rate 
margin. Third, it increases mortgage volumes. Higher volumes introduce two additional 
effects on mortgagee profits; there is a positive impact on operating income and, as debt 
increases, the expected loss in case of default increases.  
  
Taking the lending effect into account expression 1) equals 
10)                                    ))(1()( VLpDLrp u   , 
and the corresponding first-order condition is  
11)                     .01)(0)( '''''  VLpLprLprDLrp uuu 


 
After some rearranging (see the appendix for details) is the optimal LTV-ratio defined by  
12)                       .1)1(1



 









 LLru
u
p p
p
r
L
Dr
u
  
The left hand side is, as 0p , positive. The right-hand side has three components. The first 
two components represent positive effects on operating income from a higher LTV-ratio, due 
to a higher interest rate margin and increased lending, respectively. The latter effect, which 
comes from higher debt and increased losses in case of default, depends on the probability 
ratio and the value of the lending elasticity (a feature to be discussed more extensively later). 
The effect is negative when lending is elastic with respect to the LTV-ratio 1L  and 
positive when lending is inelastic 1L .    
 
To find the impact of mortgage volumes on the LTV-ratio C , which expression 12) defines, 
we compare expression 12) to expression 9) and see how  
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From expression 13) we see that when    



  1)1( LLu p
p
r  is there no lending effect on 
the LTV-ratio BC   . In this case is the expected increase in operating income equal to the 
expected increase in loss given default that accompany a higher LTV-ratio. When the interest 
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rate margin exceeds a critical level  
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 11  the former effect dominates and there 
is a positive lending effect on the LTV-ratio BC   .ix  
 
Collateral:  )( and 0D ),(),(r ),( u  VLpp   
The final extension to this part of the model is to take into account that a higher LTV-ratio 
might impact house prices and collateral values. Appreciations and increasing collateral 
values will reduce expected losses in case of default and have a positive impact on the optimal 
LTV-ratio. Taking the collateral effect into account the expression for mortgagee profit equals 
14)                                    ),)(1()(  VLpDrLrp Du   
and the first-order condition is found from  
15) 
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When rearranging the first-order condition in terms of elasticities we find the expression that 
defines the optimal LTV-ratio in the presence of a collateral effect D as    
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Comparing this optimal LTV-ratio to LTV-ratio in the absence of a collateral effect gives us  
17)                                        .
11











 









 V
u
CD
p
p
L
Dr
  
The presence of a collateral effect, where mortgagees, by accepting higher LTV-ratios, might 
reduce their losses in case of default, has a positive impact on the optimal LTV-ratio CD   .  
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Figure 2 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
The model shows how external funding- and the conventional arguments related to deposit 
insurance and capital adequacy- risk pricing, moral hazard, lending volumes and collateral 
values impact the LTV-ratio. As these factors vary across markets and over time they might 
contribute to explain context specific LTV-ratios.  
Leveling the playing field allows us a standardized framework for analyzing and comparing 
these effects. Figure 2, where
A  is the socially optimal LTV-ratio, pictures the relation 
between the LTV-ratio and the risk exposure of a mortgagee in the scenarios above.                    
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Thinking in terms of policy, we see easily which kind of measures that will be useful in 
constraining the LTV-ratio. Increased capital ratios counteract the funding effect, the lending 
effect and the collateral effect. When house prices are driven by fundamentals, and not the 
endogenous credit constraint (see for instance Borgersen (2016)), the collateral effect is 
missing. A credit risk policy dominated by debt-servicing ability and the first-line of defense 
ensures such a scenario (Borgersen, 2016). Finally, policies to reduce the lending effect are 
contingent on the moral hazard intensity. In the absence of moral hazard ) 0( p a value on 
the lending elasticity that completely balances the effect of increased lending and higher 
operating income with the increase in debt and the effect on loss given default 1 L   will 
curb the lending effect.x When, on the other hand moral hazard is extreme   1p a mortgage 
policy that does not allow volumes to respond to higher LTV-ratios )0( L   will constrain 
the lending effect.  
The risk pricing response to a fall in house prices   
The last section showed how different mortgage market features impact the optimal LTV-
ratio for a profit-maximizing mortgagee (at origination). In this section we apply the same 
framework to analyze the risk pricing response to a fall in house prices. Seeing the LTV-ratio 
as the risk exposure of a mortgagee, our framework allows for risk pricing assessments in 
relation to changes in the LTV-ratio. As we abstract away from the demand side of the 
mortgage market we assume house price changes to be sudden, implicitly taking away a 
mortgagor’s option to increase repayments. This allows changes in house price to be passed-
through to LTV-ratios, and the current LTV-ratio to differ from the LTV-ratio at origination.    
We consider a case where, due to falling house prices, the current LTV-ratio exceeds the 
LTV-ratio at origination, .
newinitial
V
L
LV    A higher LTV-ratio increases a 
mortgagee’s risk exposure compared to origination, and this additional risk is not priced in by 
the mortgagee. The question we address in this section is how risk pricing responds to a 
higher LTV-ratio. The mortgagee’s optimization includes ex post what we refer to as a default 
effect.xi 
We start by introducing the derivative of expression 1) which has to take into account the fact 
that LV  . The first-order condition is             
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18)                0))(1()()(0
)( '''  VpVLpLrpDLrp uu 


. 
We consider a house price fall 0V which lifts the current LTV-ratio new  above the initial 
LTV-ratio initial  where 0a and  )1(  ainitialnew  . When rearranged, the first-order 
condition can be expressed as   
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The  deposit to lending ratio gives  the interest rate margin (or equivalently using our 
simplifications, the mortgage rate – which is the term we will apply in the following to 
highlight the risk pricing argument) necessary for zero net-operating profit. This first term of 
expression 19) is the break-even condition for a mortgagee.  The second term relates the 
mortgage rate to a mortgagees risk exposure at origination. This ex ante relation between the 
mortgage rate and the LTV-ratio
initial  is positive, as 0P . The latter two terms represents 
the default effect, measuring the additional risk exposure of a mortgagee that accompany a fall 
in house prices and a higher LTV-ratio. The increased risk exposure is both due to a higher 
probability of default and due to an increased cost in case of default.   
The relation between the mortgage rate and the LTV-ratio is pictured in Figure 3, where the 
ex post relation differs from the ex ante relation. The prevailing risk exposure of a mortgagee 
is, when newinitiala    and 0 , assessed by the initial mortgage contract ( ex ante). At 
origination the  mortgagor has  been offered an LTV-ratio initial  for which she pays a 
mortgage rate   .
'
Initial
p
uInitial
u
r
L
Dr 

 





  The positively sloped line starting at the break-
even condition (a mortgage rate equal to the D/L-ratio) shows that the higher the LTV-ratio is 
at origination, the higher is also the mortgage rate.    
The default effect comes into play when 0a and   initialnew  .xii As house prices have fallen 
and the risk exposure of a mortgagee has increased additional effects comes into play in the 
risk assessments of a mortgagee. These effects create  a kinked-relation between the mortgage 
rate and the mortgagees’ risk exposure ex post. 
First, is falling house prices impacting positively on the mortgage rate due to increased risk 
exposure among mortgagees newinitial   , an effect we refer to as a moral hazard effect. The 
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mortgagee response to this moral hazard effect is as indicated by the ex ante risk pricing 
relation between the LTV-ratio and risk pricing, lifting the mortgage rate ( BA  ).    
The second- and the third-effect are the ones that alter the relation between the mortgage rate 
and the LTV-ratio and create a kinked relation between the two ex post.  The second effect
   
ap
p
P 









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
 
1
111

 , which is a regime effect, is due to a higher (lower) probability of 
default (success). The regime effect increases the probability of default and puts more weight 
to the part of the profit function related to collateral. The third effect  
a
a
1
 is due to  an 
increase in the  amount of non-collateralized debt and a higher cost of default. This latter 
effect is referred to as a debt effect. The combination of the debt effect and the regime effect 
creates a default effect that increases a mortgagee’s loss given default and influences its risk 
pricing.  The default effect creates a kinked relation between the LTV–ratio and the mortgage 
rate ex post as risk pricing is more aggressive ex post than ex ante.    
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Figure 3 about here >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Summing it all up Figure 3 shows how a higher LTV-ratio  )1( ainitialnew   has three effects 
on the mortgage rate: A moral hazard effect BA  , a debt effect CB   and a regime effect 
DC  . When thinking about the latter two we see how  the house price fall and the increase 
in the LTV-ratio exclusively determines the debt effect, while the regime effect is related to 
both the elasticity of success and to the house price fall, and is thus highly context specific. 
We have drawn Figure 3 for the case where the debt effect exceeds the regime effect, i.e. 
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Summary and discussion 
There is empirical evidence for variations in LTV-ratios across markets and periods. Both the 
demand and the supply side of mortgage markets contributes to these variations. The supply 
side contribution is often argued in relation to improved credit scoring and risk pricing 
technology.   
This paper relates the LTV-ratio to the risk exposure of a mortgagee. It applies a standardized 
framework for a profit maximizingprofit-maximizing mortgagee  to derive find the optimal 
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LTV-ratio and the risk pricing response  to a housing depreciation that increasesing  
mortgageethe  risk exposure of a mortgagee. .       
First , the paper derives the optimal LTV-ratio for a mortgagee that supply mortgages using 
housing as collateral. Abstracting away from the demand side the paper highlights impacts on 
the LTV-ratio from the supply side of mortgage markets. The LTV-ratio measures the equity 
stake a mortgagor has in a house, and, naturally, lower equity increases the probability of 
default. Seeing the LTV-ratio as the risk exposure of a mortgagee variations in the LTV-ratio 
might be due to a number of factors, of which few are consistent with a view that the (inverse 
of-) LTV-ratio should be seen as an indicator of how mature a mortgage market is. .  
We benchmark our argument using a profit maximizing mortgagee funding mortgages using 
own equity. The profit maximizing LTV-ratio is one where mortgagees - at the margin - are 
paid for their actual risk exposure. Introducing welfare considerations, we find the socially 
optimal LTV-ratio to equal this LTV-ratio. 
For a mortgagee that attracts external capital the optimal LTV-ratio exceeds the socially 
optimal LTV-ratio. When leveling the playing-fieldplaying field, we give the arguments 
regarding the relation between for instance deposit insurance and capital adequacy, moral 
hazard and risk pricing, lending volumes and collateral values and the profit maximizing 
LTV-ratio a common framework. Several of these arguments, and the variations in the LTV-
ratio they create, do not stem from improved credit-scoring technology or more correct 
pricing of credit risk. Rather, they represent the opposite: Increased risk taking by 
mortgagees, or institutional arrangements protecting mortgagees from their risk exposure.    
Highlighting supply side characteristics the paper shows how the supply side of mortgage 
markets might have been a key driver in the period preceding the financial crisis where LTV-
ratios grew were allowed to grow to record highs. In the aftermath of the crisis macro-
prudential interventions, both related to credit- and capital instruments, with the aim of 
amongst other things, constraining LTV-ratios, have come in place.xiii Caps on LTV-ratios are 
basically interventions with the aim of constraining the funding effect, the lending and the 
collateral effect. While credit-related instruments such as LTV-caps are direct tools, are 
capital-related instruments are more indirect. The argument model shows however rather 
straightforward , and in a non-technical manner how capital adequacy rules can push the 
profit maximizing LTV-ratio closer to the reduce the difference between the socially optimal 
LTV-ratio.  and that which comes about when funding is external. In fact, when considering 
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our optimal LTV-ratios (as given by expressions 13 and 17) the paper shows how stricter 
capital-adequacy ratios also reduce the lending and the collateral effect, pushing the LTV-
ratio towards its socially optimal level.   XXXX 
The paper shows how external funding and problems related to asymmetric information and 
moral hazard, together with strategic behavior by mortgagees taking the lending effect and the 
collateral effect into account, might expose themselves to too high risk, allowing for higher 
LTV-ratios than what the supply side by itself, should support.  
Second, the paper considers the risk pricing response to falling house prices and an LTV-ratio 
that exceeds its value at origination. We show how risk pricing ex post ante differs from that 
ex antapost as the ex post relation between the mortgage rate and the LTV-ratio is kinked. A 
shock to the LTV-ratio creates a moral hazard effect, a debt effect and a regime effect on risk 
pricing. The two latter two creates together a default effect whicheffect that impacts positively 
on loss given default and increases the risk pricing response to a higher LTV-ratio ex post. 
This default effect is initially not priced in by the mortgagee and produces a kinked relation 
between the LTV-ratio and the mortgage rate ex post  which is in accordance with risk pricing 
terminology. 
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Appendix 1 
This appendix derives the optimal LTV-ratio for a mortgagee that takes on deposits and 
supply mortgages using housing as collateral. First, we find the optimal LTV-ratio when 
abstracting away from both the lending and the collateral effect. We start out by considering 
the profit function 
A1)                                   )))((1())()(( VLpDrLrp Du   , 
and take the derivative with respect to   (As LV   the last term disappears.) 
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Using the definition of the moral hazard elasticity
P  and the definition of the risk pricing 
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In the absence of external funding (D=0) this reduces to  
A4)                                         .
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For a profit maximizing mortgagee the optimal LTV-ratio is characterized by equality 
between the moral hazard elasticity and the risk pricing elasticity, and is correspondingly one 
where mortgagees are paid for their risk exposure at the margin.  
 
While A3’) equals expression 8), is expression A4) equal to expression 3). As expression 3)  
defines 
A  and expression 8) defines B  we find
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The lending effect  
 
Taking the lending effect )(L  into account, expression 1) is written as  
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Taking the derivative with respect to the LTV-ratio (remembering that LV  ) gives    
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Deleting L, and once again using
V
L , we have  
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This can be rewritten as   
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When applying the definition of the lending elasticity
L , and multiplying by , A9) equals 
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Dividing by p and using the definition of the moral hazard elasticity gives 
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Finally, and now we only consider the middle-term, we place the interest rate margin outside 
the parenthesis and apply the definition of the risk pricing elasticity
p , to have   
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Rearranged in terms of the moral hazard elasticity (and remember how 0p ) this equals 
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A13) - which defines  C - is equal to expression 12). Comparing A13) to A3), knowing that 
the moral hazard technology is equal across our regimes, allows us to see how expression 13) 
comes about as 
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The collateral effect 
 
Taking the collateral effect )(V  into account, expression 1) equals 
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The first-order condition is found by considering the derivative 
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Now, using the exact same steps as above - from A8) to A14) - with the only extension being 
that the definition of the collateral elasticity L is included in the last term, expression A17) 
defines the optimal LTV-ratio in the presence of collateral D (as given by expression 16) as  
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When compared to expression A14), expression A17) reproduces expression 17) as    
A18)                           .
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Appendix 2 
Appendix 2 derives the risk pricing response to a fall in house prices. Here we apply an 
extended version of expression 1) where the current LTV-ratio differs from the LTV-ratio at 
origination .
newinitial
V
L
LV   We fix 0 VL  , as neither lending volumes nor 
collateral values can be argued to respond positively to a fall in house prices ex post.  
 
The derivative of expression 1) now equals 
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We now consider a drop in house prices 0V that lifts the current LTV-ratio above the 
LTV-ratio at origination initialnew    and assume 0a   where)1(  ainitialnew  .The first-
order condition 0
)(

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can then be rewritten as 
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Inserting for initialnew  
V
L   and  respectively, gives 
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When dividing by  'p , inserting for,  )1( ainitialnew   using the definition of the moral 
hazard elasticity P and solving for the mortgage rate (or equivalently the interest rate margin) 
we have    
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The two latter terms are conditional on a>0 and initialnew    and represent the default effect.  
As house prices fall and the risk exposure of a mortgagee increases, the new (and higher) 
LTV-ratio introduces two additional effects on the relation between the mortgage rate and the 
LTV-ratio. One of these effects    
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 is due to the higher probability of 
default (the regime effect), while the other  
a
a
1
 comes from a mortgagee’s higher amount 
of non-collateralized debt (the debt effect). Together these two effects represent the increase 
in loss given default that comes about when house prices fall and the risk exposure of a 
mortgagee increases, and is referred to as the default effect in the model.    
 
Appendix 3 
Appendix 3 derives the optimal LTV-ratio in the case of an integrated lending- and collateral 
effect. We start out from a relation between the LTV-ratio, the mortgage volume and the 
collateral value given by .0)(V and 0)(L   where))(( ''   VVLL The derivative of the lending 
volume with respect to the LTV-ratio equals   
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The second equality sign comes about by multiplying both the nominator and the denominator 
by L, V and  , while the last equality sign comes from using the definition of the collateral 
elasticity )(
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  VV
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  as presented earlier, and introducing the lending to 
collateral elasticity   )(')( VLVLEl VLLV  .   
Using expression 14), which we reproduce as A24), taking the integrated lending effect into 
account,  
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the first-order condition equals  
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Rearranging, and expressing the first-order condition in terms of elasticities, the optimal 
LTV-ratio (for an integrated lending- and collateral effect) Inte is defined by    
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When compared to A3’), that is the step before introducing lending and collateral in the 
baseline model, but allowing for external funding, the optimal LTV-ratio may be expressed as  
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When compared to A18) we see how the optimal LTV-ratio is higher with an integrated 
lending-collateral effect relative to when the two effects are separated as long as the interest 
rate margin (the mortgage rate) exceeds a critical level.   
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While more complex than A18), where the lending effect is separated from the collateral 
effect, and remembering the different definitions of the lending elasticity and the lending to 
collateral elasticity, it is still is a critical mortgage rate that ensures a higher LTV-ratio.  
 
 
 
i See also Campbell and Cocco (2003) or Cocco (2004) for the role of housing in household’s portfolio risk and 
Hryso et al (2010) for house prices and the risk exposure of households.     
ii See Borgersen (2015b) - and the references therein - for the relation between mortgage demand and the LTV-
ratio.  
iii The seminal paper by Jackson and Kasserman (1980) distinguishes between two basic views on mortgage 
default, the equity theory of default and the ability-to pay theory of default, respectively.   
iv See the references in Park and Bang (2014) for the loss severity of mortgagee exposure. 
v This framework separates the lending- from the collateral effect, in order to analyze the two effects separately. 
The alternative would be to integrate the two, making the mortgage volume a function of collateral, which again 
is related to the LTV-ratio .0)(V and 0)(L   where))(( ''   VVL  Appendix 3 derives the optimal LTV-ratio for an 
integrated lending-collateral effect where results are qualitatively equal to those of the main model.  
 vi While our argument is related to moral hazard, differences in for instance household income, and hence debt-
servicing ability could alternatively be applied to argue for different LTV-ratios. For a discussion of mortgagor 
characteristics and mortgagee risk see, for instance, Diaz-Serrano (2004) or Leece (2004).  
vii Our model gives a conventional role to both external funding in general and capital-adequacy more specific. 
This allows for a straightforward argumentation regarding the impact of external funding on the LTV-ratio. 
While deposit insurance impacts positively, is the impact from tighter capital adequacy rules on the LTV-ratio 
negative. See for instance Anginer et al (2014) for a general discussion on deposits guarantee schemes and Van 
Hoose (2007) for a survey of the (theoretical) literature on capital ratios. 
viii The moral hazard technology is represented by the probability function 0)( ),( '   ppp and equal moral 
hazard technology equates the probability function, which implies that the elasticity of success (the moral hazard 
elasticity) )(
)(
' 

 p
pp 



 only differs with respect to the LTV-ratio itself, when comparing scenarios A and B.    
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ix Alternatively, we may express the condition for a positive lending effect in terms of a maximum value for the 
lending elasticity
 
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p
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


1
1
1 . When 0p  inelastic lending, 1L , is the condition for a positive lending 
effect. When 0p  is a positive lending effect compatible with elastic lending 1L .    
x The lending effect is determined by the parenthesis in expression 13), which may be expressed as
    LLu ppr   1)1( . When ) 0( p we see that 1 L   eliminates the lending effect while 0 L  does the 
same when ) 1( p .  
xi When shifting from an ex ante to an ex post scenario, we keep 0 VL  as neither lending volumes nor 
collateral values realistically would respond positively to a fall in house prices ex post. See Appendix 2 for 
details. 
xii The reasoning of the model implies symmetric effects in the sense that 0a and  newinitial   creates a 
situation with a lower probability of default and a reduced cost of default, which, analogue to the case of 
depreciations, will have implications for risk pricing during periods of appreciations.     
xiii See for instance Gelati and Moessner (2011) or Lim et al (2011) for a review of the literature on 
Macroprudential Policy and Taylor (2009) for a discussion of the policy response(s) to the financial crisis. 
